This paper discusses the main criticism launched against legal monism and the Pure Theory of Law, as envisaged by Hans Kelsen and the other proponents of the Vienna School of Jurisprudence, namely the criticism voiced by two of the most eminent legal theorists, H.L.A. Hart and Joseph Raz. According to them, legal monism fails to offer a satisfactory theory of the identity of legal systems and it therefore simply cannot be considered a viable theory of legal systems, because it leads to obviously absurd consequences. These arguments which take the form of an attack on the most basic tenets of the Pure Theory of Law and thus legal monism, will be duly addressed and consequently rebutted in this paper, particularly in order to be able to maintain legal monism in its juridicoepistemological manifestation as a working and viable theory of the law.
INTRODUCTION
It may not be chic to confess to being a legal monist these days, in particular because of the apparently dualist state of the international legal order which lacks effective enforcement mechanisms 1 and hence requires transposition to penetrate the national legal order in order to take full effect within it. 2 Furthermore legal pluralism, in contrast to monism, displays immensely appealing features such as 'good, progressive, tolerant, non-domineering' -in contrast to the characteristics of hierarchically ordered systems: 'bad, regressive, intolerant, domineering.' 3 Besides the direct and intuitive appeal of both dualism and pluralism, the main reason why legal monism (as envisaged by Hans Kelsen and other proponents of the Pure Theory of Law 4 ) is unfashionable among legal theorists and scholars these days is thataccording to prevailing opinion -it has decisively been refuted by two of the most eminent legal theorists, namely H.L.A Hart in his essay 'Kelsen's Doctrine of the Unity of Law' 5 and Joseph Raz, in particular in his book The Concept of a Legal System. 6 In general, Hart and Raz also argue that laws exist as part of legal systems 7 or that there is a system-constituting social rule, i.e. the rule of recognition, which specifies the membership conditions of legal norms. 8 Yet neither of them ever went as far as Kelsen and declared that all legal norms in the world necessarily formed part of a unitary legal order. 9 According to their criticism, legal monism fails to offer a satisfactory theory of the identity of legal systems and therefore it simply cannot be considered a viable theory of a legal system, because it leads to obviously absurd consequences. The membership of norms in a given legal system can only be ascertained with reference to the social practices of identification, which characterize the activity of the primary law-applying institutions of that legal system.
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Given the impact of this criticism on the substantial value of the Pure Theory of Law as a theory to conceive of the law in general and on legal monism in particular, a scrutinizing analysis of Hart and Raz's arguments is immensely worthwhile. These arguments, which, in principle, take the form of an attack on the most basic tenets of the Pure Theory of Law and legal monism, must be duly addressed and credibly rebutted in order to maintain monism in the juridico-epistemological sense as a working and viable theory of the law. This paper undertakes this task, firstly, with regard to the arguments voiced by H.L.A. Hart, and subsequently by tackling those of Joseph Raz. By doing so, it mostly builds upon the arguments made by Lars Vinx in two of his contributions, 11 but goes beyond them in various ways.
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Having said that, this paper should not be read as a type of 'Wittgenstein's poker', 13 i.e. as
giving an answer to the question of who has won this controversy between intellectual giants.
It should first and foremost be seen as a defence of Kelsen, Verdross, and Kunz, and their concept of legal monism against misinterpretation. But it is also true that this approach in itself is not sufficient. Most importantly, even though the mere negative rebuttal of both Hart and
Raz's criticism of monism and the Pure Theory of Law might be highly convincing in itself, this paper will also provide positive support for Kelsen's position. This will mostly be done by reference to the Kantian and neo-Kantian roots of the Pure Theory of Law through which it becomes evident -epistemologically as well as logically -that monism remains the only choice if we want to consider the law as having an objective meaning for everyone. 14 184-194. 12 Especially with regard to the epistemological roots of the Pure Theory of Law; the Grundnorm of international law and arguments in favour of a positive constitution of the international legal order (thus also going beyond the arguments of Jörg Kammerhofer); and the epistemological necessity of the primacy of international law (a view which is in contrast to Kelsen itself, but more in line with the views of his students Alfred Verdross and Josef L. Kunz). 13 Norms (published posthumously in 1979) 15 towards a rather anti-logical and more positivist approach. 16 Yet nonetheless his intellectual development during his 'classical phase' (from circa 1921 to 1960) still represents the richest and most rewarding period in all of Kelsen's work in which he attempted to provide a Kantian or neo-Kantian mooring and transcendental undergirding for his legal theory.
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On the basis of this epistemological and logical groundwork, this paper intends to counter the overall claims by Hart and Raz that legal monism as presented by Kelsen is either trivially true and therefore not interesting, or interesting, but false. In fact, it will be argued that monism is both logically true and interesting, since it is able to provide any observer of the law with new information which goes beyond mere tautological truths. Through its central conceptions (such as the strict dichotomy of 'Is' and 'Ought', the basic norm, and the hierarchy of norms), the Pure Theory of Law succeeds in explaining the objective meaning of norms, 18 which is 'legal validity', and in satisfactorily resolving conflicts between norms of different bodies of law. Only monism takes the concept of legal validity seriously, 19 as will be explained in more detail below, and therefore it cannot be uninteresting to lawyers.
H.L.A. HART AND KELSEN'S UNITY DOCTRINE
According to Hart, it is Kelsen's most serious mistake to claim that all valid laws necessarily form a single system. The monist theory of national and international law, Hart continues, is simply unsuccessful because of the major fallacies Kelsen overlooked when envisaging this doctrine. 20 Despite certain similarities between Hart and Kelsen and the latter's (albeit limited) influence on the former, Hart is rather anxious to clarify that his theory differs from the Pure Theory of Law in important ways. 21 In this vein, Hart is a force to be reckoned with, and there is no way around his arguments. 22 These very arguments will now be discussed in three separate steps: 23 (1) the strong version of monism; (2) the problem of the basic norm; and (3) the principle of validating purport and the weak version of monism. 24 All of these arguments will subsequently subjected to close scrutiny in order to save legal monism from theoretical obsolescence and absurdity. 23 Cf. Giudice (n 9) 157. 24 As a fourth argument, one could add Hart's criticism that Kelsen cannot accept conflicts between valid laws in analogy to the logical principle of non-contradiction; cf. Hart, 'Kelsen's Doctrine of the Unity of Law' (n 5) 565-574. Since the later Kelsen has, however, given up this claim and accepted the existence of normative conflicts (cf. especially Kelsen, General Theory of Norms (n 15) 106-114 and 123-127), this problem need not concern us at this point; cf. Hart, 'Answers to Eight Questions' (n 20) 290. 25 Hart, 'Kelsen's Doctrine of the Unity of Law' (n 5) 554. 26 In the same vein, Kelsen intends his theory to be capable of cognizing and identifying any given legal order a priori 35 as well as providing the observer with knowledge about said legal order. In other words, logically speaking, his theory is necessarily true, but it also provides the lawyer with information beyond mere trivial truths. 29 Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (n 27) 363 and 373.
The Strong Version of Monism: Logical and Epistemological Necessity
However, such cognition of the law is only possible if one strictly adheres to the separation of 'Is' and 'Ought' and thereby eliminates from the object of legal cognition all alien elements and everything that is not strictly law, such as metaphysics, theology, politics, psychology, sociology, and ethics. 36 More concretely, Kelsen emphasizes that the purity of a theory of legal cognition must be secured in two directions: firstly, it is to be secured against the 'Is' and 'the claims of a so-called "sociological" point of view,' and secondly it must also be 'secured against the claims of the natural law theory, which […] takes legal theory out of the realm of positive legal norms and into the realm of ethico-political postulates.' 37 Law hence is, on the one hand, separate from morality as an act 'posited' by human beings, and therefore a positive 'Is'; but at the same time it is, on the other hand, also separate from fact by being obeyed, and if not obeyed, by being applied, which amounts to a normative 'Ought'. 38 In other words, the 'Ought' is irrevocably separated from the 'Is', and yet the former is to be treated as a descriptive 'Is', because of its posited nature. 39 As a result, the validity of a given posited legal norm is not dependent on its substantive moral value or sociological facts, but rather on the formal procedures under which it has been created (and thus on the question whether it actually forms part of a given legal system 40 ). In
Kelsen's words, the reason for the validity of one given legal norm can only be the validity of another norm, 41 and not its conformity with moral standards or empirical facts. According to the concept of the hierarchy of norms (Stufenbau der Rechtsordnung), which was first developed by Kelsen's colleague Adolf Julius Merkl and only later incorporated by Kelsen into his Pure Theory of Law, 42 any given legal order -even the most primitive one where a chieftain wields absolute power -necessarily consists of at least two normative levels. The reason for this is that the very enthronization of said chieftain requires prior normative authorization. 43 Therefore any legal order is necessarily ordered in a hierarchical manner and contains at least 62 Cf. Green, 'Hans Kelsen and the Logic of Legal Systems' (n 14) 366-367. For example, an international legal norm could obligate a State to prohibit torture in any event, whilst the domestic law of the same State commands the national authorities to torture terrorist suspects, making joint obedience impossible. A dualist State might resolve the conflict in favour of national law, claiming that 'national interests have priority', thereby effectively denying the validity of the international norm in question. And a pluralist-minded State would most likely refrain from resolving the conflict all, which would subject the whole situation to a dilemma for the individuals involved. What both scenarios have in common is that legal validity must simply have a different meaning within the dualist and pluralist theories: in dualism, the validity of an international norm is denied in favour of national law on extralegal grounds, and thus the international legal norm is somehow 'less' valid than national law; in pluralism, the logical rule of non-contradiction would also demand a different meaning, since eventually one of the two norms would be applied arbitrarily, either by action (the national norm) or by omission (the international norm), but without any legal specification. This entails that the two legal norms in conflict are valid in a different sense without any legal grounding. Yet since 'legal validity' is equivalent with the very existence of a legal norm, the assumption of 'less' validity or simply a varying degree of validity is incommensurable with an objectively comprehensible analysis of the law.
an equivocation in it. 63 Hence dualists and pluralists should be well aware that what they are actually talking about may no longer be law. 64 Thus the concept of legal monism protects the law from methodological arbitrariness 65 and acts, through the Grundnorm, as a functional precondition of the legal science and thereby as an epistemological tool to outline its object of cognizance. 66 In this vein, any construction other than monism will necessarily result in an equivocation or outright denial of the legal nature of international law, 67 and a plurality of basic norms is -under these assumptions -consequently inconceivable. The ultimate conclusion of the postulate that the same ought to be cognized as the same 68 is that, as Kelsen himself puts it, '[t]he unity of the epistemological standpoint demands imperiously a monistic view,' 69 and international law and national law form part of the same legal order under one common basic norm. 70 Hart correctly summarizes that these claims can be reduced to the contention that all law forms a single system since there is a form of knowledge in the shape of legal cognition which studies both national and international law as subsumable under the single description 'valid laws' and hence constitutes 'its object' as a unity. 71 Hart, however, does not engage properly with Kelsen's use of Kant's unitary object of cognizance, and is to be criticized for brushing off this argument in one single sentence, stating: 'Surely we might as well attempt to deduce from the existence of the history of warfare or the science of strategy that all wars are one or all armies are one.' 72 Hart's objection fails for two reasons. First, Hart's argument does not work because his analogy of warfare does not work. Not only is it common sense that law and war are not relevantly similar, but it is also crucial to recall that Kelsen's legal monism flows from the logic of norms and the nature of normativity. As a consequence, there is no reason why Kelsen would be committed to a similar account where, because in warfare as an empirical fact, logic and normativity have no application. 73 They would certainly apply to the law of warfare, but
that is not what Hart means.
Second, Hart appears to misunderstand a particular element of Kantian philosophy, namely the unitary object of cognizance. To conceive of specific objects as a transcendental unity does not mean that these objects are all the same -this would be too simple a solution.
What this unity entails is, in Kant's words, a 'productive synthesis' 74 of empirical data into one single concept. 75 Kant's transcendental unity of apperception is the a priori ground of all concepts through which all of the manifold given in an empirical sensation is united into a concept of the object. 76 In other words, all wars or all armies are not one in the same way as all laws are not one. But what is the same is the conceptual cognition of these objects, and their belonging to their respective unitary concept of 'war', 'army', or 'law'. The Second World War is not the same as the American Civil War, but they form a unitary object of cognizance 'war'
by being observed as a large-scale armed conflict between different parties. Equally, the crime of murder is not the same as the crime of theft, but they both form part of the unitary object of cognizance 'law' by being cognized as part of an effective, self-creating, and coercive normative system which has been posited by human beings for the regulation of their behaviour. 77 The essentiale of law ultimately is its validity which is coterminous with its very existence 78 and not subject to gradation. Either a specific legal norm is valid (and hence binding) and therefore exists, or it is invalid and therefore does not exist. 79 This means that all law forms a unitary object of cognizance qua validity which derives from the Grundnorm as the very fount of this validity. The unity of the law can hence only be denied if one excludes the entire international legal order from the system of law. Only then would the two ordersnational and international law -be located on two completely different levels of cognition and the epistemological unity would disappear. 80 The 'validity' of national law would then have a meaning different from the 'validity' of international law.
Third, Hart's implicit criticism that either Kelsen is right, but what he claims is trivially true and thus not interesting, or that Kelsen's claim is interesting but false, is also to be rejected.
It might be correct to say that the way of how Kelsen reaches his epistemological conclusion on the basis of Kantian and neo-Kantian philosophy is terrifyingly trivial, 81 because to claim that all law is law qua being law and thus forms 'one law' is necessarily true, but this would of course not be an interesting claim. Analytic a priori claims ('all bachelors are unmarried') are certainly always and trivially true and hence uninteresting. The decisive argument is, however, that Kelsen's claims are not analytic a priori, but synthetic a priori claims in the Kantian sense 82 and therefore not inevitably uninteresting due to their necessary nature. This means, alternatively put, that his claims entail propositions whose predicate concepts are not already contained in the respective subjects, 83 or that certain interesting consequences follow from them which were not immediately perceptible. The most important consequence of these synthetic a priori claims is that only the presupposition of one single Grundnorm allows for the cognition of valid law, whilst the assumption of two (as in dualism) or more basic norms (as in pluralism) prevents such cognition. The reason for that is that assuming the existence of more than one basic norm will necessarily result in an equivocation of the meaning of 'legal validity', which would thereby destroy the very essence of the law. Furthermore, in contrast to dualism or pluralism, monism does not surrender when it comes to normative conflicts. This is exactly what is at stake in the question of whether the law forms one system or not, namely how the law is to be cognized and applied, and how lawyers can be enabled to resolve conflicts between legal norms. In sum, Hart's objection to the epistemological necessity of legal monism is mistaken and fails to convince on all grounds.
The Conundrum of the Basic Norm
Yet it is exactly this very basis of normativity in the Pure Theory of Law with which Hart also takes considerable issue: the Grundnorm. In Hart's own theory, the foundation of a legal system lies in the 'rule of recognition' which, as an accepted and practized social rule, provides the criteria for identifying all types of rules as rules and hence members of a given system. 85 Thus, in contrast to the transcendental nature of the basic norm, the rule of recognition simply is a sociological and present matter of fact 86 which can be expressed by utterances such as 'it is the law that …' in the practice of courts, officials, and private persons. 87 By establishing this extra-systemic foundation of the law on the basis of social practice, however, Hart unduly interfuses empirical facts and the normativity of the law and thereby transgresses the dichotomy of the 'Is' and 'Ought'. 88 159-160. to claim that Kelsen's attempt amounts to a meaningless reduplication than it would be to say that Hart's concept of the rule of recognition amounts to an empty reduplication.
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Yet besides Hart's theoretical attack on Kelsen's proposed basic norm of international law in the shape of consuetudines sunt servandae, there is also one major doctrinal difficulty with this particular content of the Grundnorm that needs to be discussed and resolved in order to support monism. The problem is that it puts customary international law at the top of the hierarchy of positive international law and thereby subordinates the entire international legal order to it.
118 But since there is no formal hierarchy of sources in public international law, and hence all sources -treaties, custom, and general principles -rank as equal, 119 no international lawyer could therefore accept that treaty law is somehow derived from custom. This assumption is hence not capable of describing and explaining the law as it is. Therefore one option to save Kelsen's concept of the basic norm of international law is to return to a Grundnorm without any content which merely sets out the transcendental conditions for a unified legal order: a terminus for the hierarchy of norms; the fount of the validity of all legal norms; and the unifying force of the legal order. Norm-creation, as Jörg Kammerhofer suggests, could then be explained by an explicit 'constitution of international law' or a 'historically first constitution' as a meta-meta-stratum above pacta sunt servanda and consuetudines sunt servandae as the meta-norms on law-creation. Although treaties, custom, and general principles would form separate branches of international law, 120 they would be connected by this superstructure which regulates their interrelationship. This meta-metastratum would need to consist of positive norms, yet it remains doubtful whether such positive norms exist.
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The most promising contender for this meta-meta-law of international law is of what is accepted as law-creating in international law. 122 It remains uncertain, however, whether this provision is even of an actual epistemological value because there might be other sources of international law omitted in Article 38. 123 Thus the enumeration of sources in this provision and its position as a meta-meta-law of international law is only correct if it corresponds to the number of meta-norms that actually exists, which means, a fortiori, that it is merely declaratory in nature. The reasoning behind Article 38 being declaratory is that it is generally accepted as such, and that the meta-norms on international law-creation (i.e. the sources of international law) are created by general acceptance. As a result, the real claim here is that the epistemological position of Article 38 arises from its correspondence with the metameta-law's condition for meta-law creation (i.e. general acceptance). 124 It nonetheless remains doubtful whether Article 38 really constitutes such a meta-meta-law for international law, and international lawyers remain rather sceptical about this claim, in particular because of this provision's non-exhaustive character. 125 The problem is that the assumed 'constitution' of international law either lacks positivity (i.e. it only exists in the minds of international lawyers) or perceptibility (i.e. it is positive, but simply very difficult to perceive due to its unwritten nature). 126 It is, however, indisputable that there are certain constitutionalizing trends in international law, 127 and therefore the latter view is much more plausible. There is a positive-legal constitution of international law which regulates international law-making, but due to its highly fragmented status, it is just very difficult to perceive. Yet fragmentation and difficulties in perceiving the elements of this constitution do not speak against its positive character -in the same way as the fragmented and i.e. the meta-law as constituted by the principles of pacta sunt servanda, consuetudines sunt servandae, etc.
In conclusion, Hart's criticism of Kelsen's theory of the Grundnorm cannot only be negatively rebutted, but can also serve as an excellent starting point to engage in a discussion which extensively and positively supports Kelsen's concept of the Grundnorm of international law, thus corroborating a monist view of the law.
The Weak Version of Monism: The Principle of Validating Purport
At the outset, it must be clearly emphasized again that Kelsen never distinguishes between a strong (i.e. necessary) and weak (i.e. contingent) version of monism. Let us nonetheless engage with Hart's criticism of Kelsen's 'principle of effectiveness' which, in Kelsen's words, legitimizes a coercive national legal order 'for the territory of its actual effectiveness as a valid legal order and the community constituted by this coercive order as a "State" in the sense of international law.' 135 Hart calls this chain of delegation between international and national law the relationship of validating purport, and argues that legal monism fails because it conflates this very relationship with the relationship of validation proper. Hart likens this to a fictitious situation wherein he writes a paper on Kelsen and concurrently receives a request from the Vice-Chancellor of Oxford University to write a paper on Kelsen. Hart concludes that without establishing the exact circumstances surrounding these two events, it remains impossible to ascertain whether he indeed obeyed the request or not. 136 The central problem at stake is that of two different intentional states of mind: validation proper denotes a situation where a norm is adopted with the intent of creating it on the basis of another one, for instance when a judge identifies a particular norm as valid law on the basis of an accepted rule of recognition or if a national parliament adopts a legal act in accordance with the relevant constitutional procedures.
Validating purport, conversely, means that legal norms which fit a certain description, are deemed valid regardless of whether they were created in order to become members of the legal order containing that description. are not the same as questions whether international law treats national law as forming part of a single system with itself and whether national law is valid according to international law on the basis of the principle of effectiveness. 139 Since the principle of effectiveness is hence a mere expression of validating purport built into positive international law, unity between two bodies of law cannot be established if one of them recognizes as valid for itself what is valid in the other. It simply treats foreign rules in the same manner as its own rules, but it does not ingest these foreign rules. Hence the subjective meaning of this act is a testament. This, however, may not be sufficient, because from an objective viewpoint, it may not be a testament in the legal sense as some formalities were not observed. Thus the objective meaning denotes what ought to happen independently of what anyone wishes to be or not to be. 141 After all, it is obvious that usurping and abusing the authority of public offices, as the famous Hauptmann von Köpenick did, 142 only satisfies the subjective, but not the objective meaning of the law, and that the lack of real legal authority results in the nullity of the alleged legal act. 143 In the same vein Kelsen would certainly also have rejected Hart's idea that the Vice-Chancellor of Oxford University can put himself in a genuine position of normative authority over Hart by merely purporting to give orders to him. As a consequence, it is highly implausible to attribute to Kelsen a principle such as validating purport which involves an obvious confusion of objective and subjective legal.
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Furthermore, there is another aspect to this issue. Hart's distinction between validation
proper and validating purport is of a substantive nature, which, however, is entirely beside the point to Kelsen's theory. Kelsen, as is well known, does not explore substance ('any kind of content might be law' 145 ), but only the form in which the legal substance is to be accounted for by legal science. Prima facie, it is true that subjective purport may or may not play a role in law-creation. Individual parties, for example, can agree to enter into contractual relations through mere conduct which is not intended to create a norm. 146 Furthermore, in constitutional legal terms, some processes of norm-creation might require some intentional use of a particular international law is superior, and not, as Hart claims, because the principle of effectiveness purports to validate national law. 153 Hart fails to acknowledge Kelsen's argument that the existence of a legal system -and thereby the defensibility of a certain construction of that legal system -depends on constraints of effectiveness. For Kelsen, it would not be scientific to postulate the existence of a particular legal order unless the behaviour it claims to govern also exhibits sufficient conformity with the norms of the system. 154 The consequence is that monism under the primacy of international law has to be compatible with these constraints of effectiveness in order to amount to a viable description of the law. This is in fact the case and can easily be demonstrated by pointing out the existing system of States and other international legal subjects which interact with one another on a regular basis. Moreover, they do so in recognition of international law, such as that no State -despite the occasionally serious scepticism -seriously denies the legal quality of international law, 155 and that international obligations are complied with 156 lest States incur international responsibility and risk subsequent sanctions. Hart is therefore wrong in assuming that monism under the primacy of international law depends on nothing but a relation of validating purport between the principle of effectiveness and national law, and he fails to make the case that monism cannot account for State behaviour in a descriptively plausible way. 157 The last argument against Hart's criticism is that legal monism is in fact able to In sum, Hart's critique must therefore be rejected.
JOSEPH RAZ AND THE IDENTITY OF LEGAL SYSTEMS
Joseph Raz is the other legal theorist besides Hart who has critically engaged with Kelsen's theory and his monist claim. In doing so, Raz formed very strong opinions and explicit views on Kelsen which he follows through and defends with an impressive philosophic will. And although he somewhat rehabilitates Kelsen's reputation by defending him against Hart on the basis of the strength and robustness he sees in Kelsen's writings, 162 Raz is nonetheless of the opinion that Kelsen errs in stipulating the Grundnorm as an epistemological requirement at the apex of the legal order in order to bestow unity on it. 163 In concreto, Raz argues that the reason why a basic norm is not necessary for the unity of the legal system can be easily understood by examining the following two cases: (1) there are non-identical legal orders which share a Grundnorm; and (2) even without the Grundnorm, a unified legal order is possible. 164 As will become clear in the analysis below, the first argument refers to the hierarchy of norms and the chain of delegation, whilst the second argument deals with the basic norm itself. It will also become evident that Raz further developed the arguments by Hart, and that they are, for this reason, fairly similar. 165 And yet for the same reason Raz's criticism must fail, as it ends up misunderstanding and misconstruing Kelsen's theory.
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Chains of Validity and the Identity of Legal Orders
At the outset, Raz offers a reconstruction of the most basic tenets of Kelsen's theory in the form of two (in his opinion: flawed) axioms from which two further theorems can be derived.
For the purposes of the present section, only the first axiom is relevant which reads as follows:
'Two laws, one of which directly or indirectly authorizes the creation of the other, belong to the same legal system.' From this, Raz derives the theorem that 'if one law authorizes the creation of another or if both are authorized by a third law, then both belong to the same legal system.' 167 Thereby this axiom and theorem introduce the concept of a chain of validity. Raz, however, emphasizes that they also demonstrate the flaws in Kelsen's theory: the derived 162 Cf. e.g., Joseph Raz, 'Two Views of the Nature of the Theory theorem is false as the fact that two norms are linked by a chain of delegation (or validity) is in itself insufficient to guarantee that they in fact belong to the same legal order. And if the derived theorem is false, so must be the axiom from which it has been derived by way of modus tollens. 168 Raz presents a simple example to illustrate his claim that the Grundnorm cannot be the decisive criterion for the unity of a given legal order, as it is possible to conceive of nonidentical legal orders sharing a basic norm. If the first axiom -asserting that all the laws belonging to one chain of validity are part of one and the same legal order -were indeed true, the peaceful granting of independence to new States would be impossible. 169 Raz asks to imagine that country A has a colony B, and that both territories are governed by the same legal The second option to rebut Raz's argument and to show that there is no chain of validity is to regard both the laws of A and B as parts of the overarching international legal order qua monism. 177 Even if one adopts a monist view under the primacy of national law, the conclusion that there is only one legal order is inevitable. In this scenario, the basic norm would be located 181
In order to demonstrate his claim, Raz uses the example of a 'legally minded observer' coming to a country where laws can derive their validity either from a written constitution or a customary constitution. 182 This observer will subsequently wonder whether the codified and the customary constitutions belong to the same legal order. To answer this question, Kelsen would refer the observer to the Grundnorm, and reply that since neither of the constitutions depends on the other, and since there is no superior positive law which could delegate them, the two constitutions can only be authorized by one and the same basic norm. Ergo they belong to the same legal order. For Raz, however, this method represents a petitio principii, as he regards the basic norm mainly as a power-conferring norm, that is, as authorizing normcreation. 183 And to identify the relevant authorizing content of the basic norm, according to Kelsen, one must identify 'the facts through which an order is created and applied.' 184 Yet this will drive the observer to despair, because then he or she would only be able to identify the legal order with the help of the basic norm, whilst the basic norm can only be identified after the identity of the legal has been established. Therefore, the Grundnorm represents a vicious cycle and cannot solve the problem of identity and unity of legal orders. 185 As a first step, one could counter this argument with reference to the Pure Theory's epistemological a priori truth that the customary constitution and the codified constitution cannot fail to belong to the same legal order if they are both valid law. 186 Thus, the question whether the codified or the customary constitution belong to the same legal order or whether there are actually two distinct legal orders in force is not problematic for the Kelsenian legally minded observer once it is generally admitted that both are valid law. In this vein, it does not make sense to criticize Kelsen for not providing a criterion to answer this question. 187 The problem is that a sceptic will not be convinced by the epistemological force of the Pure Theory of Law. As a second step, one could therefore take recourse, as suggested by Vinx, to our fictional protagonist, the Kelsenian law-abiding person. 188 The interest of such a person would be to determine what the law requires, and in order to do so, this person must presuppose the Grundnorm to cognize the normative nature of the law. Even an anarchist, according to Kelsen, could describe the law as a system of valid and behaviour-regulating norms without having to approve of this law. 189 Although Raz criticizes this element in Kelsen's theory as a moral statement and thus an impurity, he eventually accepts the role of the basic norm as a means for the jurist to pretend that law is a valid system of norms. 190 Persisting differences in this respect aside 191 and in the context of the present analysis, we can consequently agree that both Kelsen and Raz would accept such a fictitious law-abiding person. From an empirical point of view, this person could find that both the customary and the codified constitution are considered to be valid by large groups of members of society, and that he or she must therefore comply with both. Potential conflicts between the two constitutions, however, must somehow be resolved, which is only possible by presuming a content of the Grundnorm which makes joint compliance possible. Thereby both custom and codified law become normatively coordinated parts of the same hierarchy of norms, and the question whether there is one or whether there are two legal orders can never become a serious issue for the law-abiding person. 192 Nonetheless, a Razian sceptic could, at this point, simply reiterate their critique that this assumption is begging the question, since to claim that there must be a possibility to comply with both custom and statute because of their being valid is only possible if we already know that they both form part of the same legal order. What is required here is an independent criterion to resolve the issue of identity before the appeal to joint compliance is made. 193 Thus, if we examine the relationship between international and national law, it becomes clear that a practice-based criterion, according to which the observer would simply opt for the validity of that body of law which enjoys a higher degree of effectiveness, would not work to establish the unity of the law. Kelsen himself acknowledges that there are no international lawapplying institutions whose practice of recognition could provide for such a criterion. 194 The same applies by analogy to the example of the two constitutions. Vinx argues that if we assume instances of disagreement among the members of society and its legal practitioners as to whether there is a normative relation between the customary and the codified constitution, it is possible to imagine that some members of society or the jurists believe, while others deny that both constitutions are valid. Equally, one can imagine that both society and jurists agree that both are valid, while they disagree with respect to the nature of the normative relationship between them. It is exactly this example where practice-based or institutional criteria fail to provide a conclusive answer to the question of identity and unity of the law. But a solution could be found in the behaviour of the law-abiding person: if we presuppose the effectiveness of both constitutions, this law-abiding person will necessarily be biased towards construing the broadest possible set of effective rules as parts of one legal order. Thus to deny a norm membership in the legal order would be tantamount to denying its legal validity. Yet since this person is interested in upholding the effects of the law, he or she will avoid this validityannulling conclusion whenever possible 195 -in the same way as authorities interpret customary norms in accordance with the set of positive norms and vice versa in order to make them applicable without any normative conflicts. 196 As a result, Vinx concludes, the law-abiding person will base their judgments regarding the structure of the legal order in question on hypotheses that cannot be fully explained in terms of sociological or empirical observation.
Once one adopts the perspective of law-abidingness, Raz's allegation of circularity does not apply anymore, as this allegation presupposes agreement on the point that a satisfactory account of the identity of legal orders must be one that appeals to purely descriptive criteriaan assumption the Pure Theory of Law rejects altogether. 197 To conclude, it is also possible to recast this rebuttal of Raz in logical terms, namely in the form of a Kantian transcendental argument 198 through which the sceptic is shown that they cannot help but undermine their own position in the course of defending it. In other words, this specific argument proves that the truth of its conclusion is a necessary condition of there being any cognition of law at all, since if the conclusion were not true, there could be no experience to falsify it. 199 To this end, Stanley Paulson gives the following example for a transcendental argument to corroborate the need for Kelsen's Grundnorm: 200 'Ought' through the basic norm. Due to the purity of the Pure Theory of Law, the Grundnorm is the only norm that is capable of conferring validity on the positive law, and nothing else. In sum, Raz's critique must therefore be rejected.
CONCLUSION
After this extensive analysis, the present conclusion can certainly give only a very brief overall appraisal of the Pure Theory of Law, as developed by the Vienna School of Jurisprudence. To begin with, one should not underestimate the philosophical foundations of this theory in the spirit of Immanuel Kant and his successors, that is, a transcendental philosophy and epistemology in the sense that cognition is not concerned with the actual objects of cognition, but the manner how we cognize objects, and, more importantly, in so far as this manner of cognition is possible a priori'. 203 Equally, one should not forget, however, that Kelsen considers the Pure Theory of Law to be a theory of positive law in general, 204 not an a priori theory. This means that it builds upon the empirically extant legal material and that it develops therefrom, in an abstracting fashion, a description of the characteristics that all legal structures share throughout space and time. 205 Yet what is of an a priori and thereby non-contingent nature is the notion of the Grundnorm which, as a logico-transcendental presupposition for cognizing legal reality, is comparable to the Kantian categories, 206 making possible the constituting of experience in the first place. Like these categories, the Grundnorm shapes the sensory material, thereby condensing it into the unity of the object of cognition and making it accessible to the observing and experiencing subject. By providing for the 'Ought' of legal norms and hence their validity, the basic norm allows the jurist to interpret acts of will as legal acts, whilst the basic norm in itself must be presupposed. 207 The reason for this is and remains Hume's law, i.e. that legal norms, as normative entities, can logically only be derived from other norms, not from facts. 208 Consequently, by strictly distinguishing between the 'Is' of the empirical and the 'Ought' of the normative world, the Pure Theory of Law accomplishes three goals: first, the stringent and consistent differentiation from extra-juridical elements, that is, metaphysics in the shape of morality, and brute facts in the form of sociology, politics, and psychology 209 -a feat for which Hart even lauded Kelsen. 210 Second, it thereby aims at the 'scientification' of the law through a descriptive methodology, thus describing what the law is, and not what it should be 211 (despite the rather complex dual nature of law as a human-made and hence posited fact and a behaviour-regulating normative entity). Lastly, the Pure Theory of Law is accordingly able to describe the law as a dynamic and self-creating system on the basis of Merkl's hierarchy of norms, culminating in the Grundnorm in order to avoid an infinite regress, according to which one can ascertain whether a certain legal norm is a member of a given legal order or not, entailing that non-members are to be presumed invalid. In a logically clear manner, it explains how it is possible to cognize both the creation and the change of the law on the basis of the chains of delegation and derogation in conformity with the duality of 'Is' and 'Ought'.
The last substantial merit to be mentioned and repeated here is the Pure Theory's potential to be extrapolated beyond the boundaries of national law. 212 If we assume that a legal norm can only be valid if it has been created in full compliance with superior norms within the Stufenbau, and also accept international law as proper law, then it necessarily follows that all law, both national and international law, form part of one unitary legal order. 213 Furthermore, it is also evident that legal monism, as an epistemological and logical necessity and in contrast to Kelsen's 'choice hypothesis', is only conceivable under the primacy of the international legal order, i.e. with a common Grundnorm at the apex of law in its entirety and international law sitting at the top of the chain of delegation. Otherwise, if we assume the national legal orders to give validity to international norms, the notion of international law would be reduced to a mere absurdity, as there would be as many international legal orders as there are States and other international legal subjects. Thus, international law necessarily delegates national law logically, not historically, through the principle of effectiveness, both enabling States to be effective legal orders and constraining them in their powers on the international plane. Hence, in such a monist legal order, there can be no difference in source, substance, and subjects of these two bodies of law, which also entails that normative conflicts between national and international law are not principally irresolvable, as dualism and pluralism claim.
At the end of the day, and despite considerable criticism by other eminent legal scholars such as Hart and Raz, the Pure Theory of Law and its logical offspring legal monism therefore have the unquestionable merit of being able to examine the structure of the law in a way that enables jurists to comprehend the legal material and to eventually put it into practice. 214 Critics might argue that legal theory does not yield any immediate benefits, but it is nonetheless all the more able to contribute indirectly to the understanding of the law. And in this vein, particularly the Pure Theory of Law has been described as being able to foster analytical thinking and problem-solving and to thereby support lawyers in solving concrete legal problems on the basis of a certain underlying logical standard. 215 
